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Timor-Leste




The semi-presidential system in the new state of Timor-Leste has institutional-
ized a political struggle between the president, Xanana Gusma˜o, and the prime
minister, Mar õ´  Alkatiri.  This has polarized political alliances and threatens the
viability of the new state.  This paper explains the ideological divisions and the
history of rivalry between these two key political actors.  The adoption of Marx-
ism by Fretilin in 1977 led to Gusma˜o’s repudiation of the party in the 1980s
and his decision to remove Falintil, the guerrilla movement, from Fretilin con-
trol.  The power struggle between the two leaders is then examined in the tran-
sition to independence.  This includes an account of the politicization of the
defense and police forces and attempts by Minister of Internal Administration
Roge´rio Lobato to use disaffected Falintil veterans as a counterforce to the
Gusma˜o loyalists in the army.  The December 4, 2002, Dili riots are explained
in the context of this political struggle.
On May 20, 2002, after one of the longest and most
painful processes of decolonization in Asia, the Democratic Republic of Ti-
mor-Leste (as East Timor was renamed) became the first new state of the
twenty-first century.  During 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the
Timorese people demonstrated an astounding capacity to endure and finally
prevail in what many observers believed to be a hopeless struggle.  What are
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their prospects now that they have achieved independence?  What kind of
political order is emerging and how will it be led?
This paper offers an analysis of the political leadership of Timor-Leste and
argues that a fault line divides the most significant political actors, a division
that is now formalized by the Constitution.  Timor-Leste has a parliamentary
system with an elected president.  In practice, a semi-presidential system has
emerged with two power centers: the presidency and the government located
in the parliament.  The president and the prime minister can each claim a
decisive popular mandate.  President Xanana Gusma˜o, as an independent
candidate, won office on April 14, 2002, with over 82% of the vote.  Dr. Marõ´
Alkatiri, as the leader of Fretilin (Frente Revoluciona´ria de Timor-Leste In-
dependente, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) won 55 of
the 88 seats in the Constituent Assembly in the elections of August 30, 2001
(the Assembly became the national parliament on May 20, 2002).  Gusma˜o,
the former resistance leader, and Alkatiri, the former activist in exile, both
make claim to nationalist and revolutionary legitimacy.
A dual leadership system is potentially destabilizing for a new state.  To
function, the constitutional principle of the separation of powers between
president and prime minister requires a collaborative arrangement between
the two.1  In Timor-Leste, the individuals occupying these two critical leader-
ship positions are political opponents, perhaps even political enemies.  The
evidence of friction appeared early: only weeks after parliament was in-
stalled, the president publicly chastised it in an address to the nation in which
he gave members of parliament six months to prove they could behave
responsibly or he would call them to account before the people.
The differences between Gusma˜o and Alkatiri go back to a crisis in the
resistance movement in the 1980s.  The origins of this falling out will be
explained below.  It will be argued that because of the long-standing antago-
nism between the two leaders, the semi-presidential system creates a rivalry
within the national leadership that could frustrate the attempt to establish an
effective and, at the same time, democratic state in East Timor.  As the gov-
ernment grapples with the challenge to combine disciplined governance with
democratic principles, the prime minister’s priority is to centralize state
power under his party’s control; the president’s priority is democratic ac-
countability in a pluralist party system.
1. The requirements of a semi-presidential system in East Timor are reviewed by J.  A. C.
Mackie, “Future Political Structures and Institutions in East Timor” in East Timor, Development
Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, eds.  Hal Hill and Joa˜o M. Saldanha (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Asia Pacific Press, the Australian National University,
2001), pp. 193, 200–01.
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The Extent of the Political Challenge
Before looking at the political leadership itself, it is necessary to appreciate
the extent of the task that the leadership faces.  The challenge is enormous:
everything is urgent.  Issues range from finding the money to pay civil ser-
vice salaries to major, long-term policy questions such as designing a viable
development strategy and working out a modus vivendi with Indonesia.
The destruction of 1999 was systematic and thorough.  East Timor was left
lacking basic human and material resources, dependent entirely upon foreign
aid.  An estimated 75% of the entire population was displaced during the
militia-inflicted violence following the August 30, 1999, vote for indepen-
dence.  Over 70% of private homes, public buildings, and essential utilities
were destroyed.  More than 200,000 people, a quarter to a third of the popula-
tion, were relocated by the Indonesian military into Indonesian West Timor.
The new state must be built from the ground up.  A report by the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released on May 20, 2002, predicted at least
three lean years after independence, before gas and oil revenues begin to
become significant.2  Unemployment in the capital, Dili, is around 70%.
With 50% of the population below 20 years of age, the pressure for jobs is
unrelenting, with around 20,000 young people joining the current labor force
of just over 300,000 each year.  Organized gangs of unemployed youths have
become an urban problem.
The trauma of the 1999 violence has not been worked through.  A number
of the militia members involved in the massacres of September 1999 have
returned from West Timor, but the process of reconciliation is faltering after
the United Nations failed to institute an effective judicial process to bring the
perpetrators of the worst violence to justice.  The unresolved position of pro-
integrationist Timorese in an independent East Timor is destabilizing.  There
are claims that some militia elements have actually reorganized themselves
under the cover of forming a “veterans” association, misrepresenting them-
selves as former pro-independence fighters.3  More destabilizing are the as-
sociations of disbanded veterans of Falintil (Forc¸as Armadas de Libertac¸a˜o
Nacional de Timor Leste, Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East
Timor).  Unemployed, angry with a government that they believe has failed
to reward them, former guerrillas have been mobilized by political interests
opposed to the government.  A special report by the secretary-general of the
United Nations Security Council noted the deterioration of internal security
2. Projected budget spending for 2001–02 was $65 million with a $20 million funding gap
that needed to be met by international donor funding.  ASPI, New Neighbour, New Challenge:
Australia and the Security of East Timor, Report (Canberra, 20 May 2002) <http://
www.aspi.org.au/timor_pub/ch1.html>.  [Accessed March 14, 2003.]
3. Ross Coulthart, “East Timor: Justice Denied?” documentary, Sunday Program, Channel
Nine, Australia, July 7, 2002.
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by late 2002.  In response to “several violent incidents, such as the destruc-
tive riot in Dili on 4 December and evidence of a rise in armed groups in
rural areas,” the Council adopted the report’s proposals for greater support
for the Timorese police and strengthening the U.N. Mission’s operational ca-
pacity to deal with the threat posed by armed groups.4
To compound its domestic problems, Timor-Leste occupies a vulnerable
geopolitical position, surrounded by the former occupying power, Indonesia.
The district of Oecussi is an enclave, isolated in Indonesian West Timor, a
hostage territory if relations sour with Indonesia.  The new state’s vulnerabil-
ity was crassly demonstrated when six Indonesian gunboats were assigned to
patrol off Dili’s coastline on the eve of the independence ceremony.5
The ASPI report bleakly warns, “East Timor could become a failed state.”6
Certainly, it has begun life, given the destruction of 1999, as a weak state,
even as the report warns, a “mendicant state.”  Weak states can prevail, and
in East Timor’s case, there are some positive indicators for its political devel-
opment.  The new state currently enjoys considerable international support,
expressed through development aid and an international peacekeeping pres-
ence.  The Roman Catholic Church, whose clergy identified with the inde-
pendence struggle, contributes to social cohesion and provides support for
civil society through its social services and pastoral work.  The people gener-
ally display a stoic social discipline and appear to have survived the violence
of Indonesian occupation surprisingly intact.  Mostly subsistence agricultural-
ists, the rural population may have rather modest expectations of the new
state.  In time, oil and gas revenues will start to underwrite state expenditures.
Nevertheless, on balance, the East Timorese will need to be exceptionally
lucky to avoid a period of political turbulence in the months and years ahead.
As Jamie Mackie has observed, if East Timor even comes close to recon-
ciling the divergent objectives of achieving disciplined governance and dem-
ocratic practice, it will be almost the only country in Southeast Asia to do
so.7  The rioting in Dili on December 4, 2002, following a public attack
against the government by President Gusma˜o, suggests that the new state is
already facing serious instability.
4. U.N. Security Council, “Recent Violence, Rise in Armed Groups Threaten Success in Ti-
mor-Leste, Peacekeeping, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council,” SC/7683, 4,715th
Meeting, New York, March 10, 2003.
5. “Gunboats Will Backfire on the Generals,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, 2002.
6. ASPI, New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia and the Security of East Timor, Report.
7. Mackie, “Future Political Structures,” p. 193.
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Jose´ Alexandre Gusma˜o, 56, known by his nom de guerre as Kay Rala
Xanana, or simply, Xanana (diminutive of Alexandre), is a poet, a man of the
people, a long-time guerrilla leader, charismatic, warm and casual.  Until his
capture in 1992, Gusma˜o led the resistance struggle in the mountains of East
Timor.  Dr. Marõ´ Bin Amude Alkatiri, 53, reserved and formal, emerged as
Fretilin’s leader in exile.  As Fretilin’s representative in Africa, as a profes-
sional and determined party organizer, and eventually as the party’s general-
secretary, Alkatiri established his dominance over the party he co-founded in
1974.  The two men, different as they are, have both demonstrated, over a
quarter of a century, extraordinary self-discipline and commitment in their
different roles as Timorese nationalists.
The political fault line between the two leaders is more than a matter of
style and temperament or the natural rivalry of two strong personalities who
have established themselves independently as national leaders.  They are di-
vided by their political beliefs.  Gusma˜o’s and Alkatiri’s differences go back
to the formative 1974–75 period when Fretilin established its control of Por-
tuguese Timor, declared independence as the Repu´blica Democra´tica de Ti-
mor Leste (Democratic Republic of East Timor, RDTL) on November 28,
1975, and then fought a war of resistance against the invading Indonesians.
Alkatiri, from the beginning, belonged to the radical left; Gusma˜o was actu-
ally in the moderate center.  Their different understandings of democracy di-
verged from 1977, when Fretilin adopted Marxism-Leninism as the party’s
ideology.  While both camps are now publicly committed to inclusive, mul-
tiparty democracy as proclaimed in Section 7 of the Constitution, their under-
standing of democratic practice in East Timor has not converged.  The
practical issue that divides them is the proper role in the new state of Fretilin,
now the majority party in the parliament.
Gusma˜o formally left Fretilin in 1987 and from that time has refused to
accept that the party has a privileged status above other political organiza-
tions.  Alkatiri, while formally accepting multiparty democracy, believes that
the party he co-founded has been from its “founding moment” in 1974 the
true representative of the Timorese people and their quest for social justice.
In practice, the Fretilin view fits within a dominant party system where oppo-
sition parties compete for power in regular elections, but a single major party
retains government.  It is doubtful that the Fretilin leadership could ever ac-
cept as legitimate a government formed by their political opponents on the
right.
It is striking how the key political players who survived 1975 have re-
turned to dominate the political landscape of independent East Timor.  Gus-
ma˜o, Jose´ Ramos Horta, Alkatiri, Roge´rio Lobato, then all in Fretilin, are key
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players today.  Their opponents in 1975, notably Ma´rio and Joa˜o Carrascala˜o,
founders of the Unia˜o Democra´tica Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union,
UDT), are their opponents now.  Respected journalist and Timor specialist
Jill Jolliffe has observed the shared background of these leaders:
The curriculum vitae of many of the leaders of UDT and Fretilin is strikingly
similar: from the family of a liurai [chief], primary school education at the Jesuit
college at Soibada, higher education in the seminary at Dare, on completion of
which they generally entered the Portuguese civil service. . . . The children of
Portuguese deportados were a second source of leadership, Horta and the Carras-
cala˜os being the most obvious example.8
Although the son of a Timorese father and a Timorese mother, Gusma˜o
grew up in an assimilado family (assimilados were indigenous Timorese who
had mastered Portuguese, paid tax, were baptized, had Portuguese citizen-
ship, and were eligible to receive a Portuguese education).9  He, too, studied
at the Jesuit seminary in Dare before working in the colonial civil administra-
tion.
Alkatiri, descended from a south Yemeni family settled in Timor, as a
practicing Muslim stood out from the mostly Catholic and mostly Portuguese
mestic¸o (mixed-ethnicity) leaders of Fretilin.  He completed primary and high
school in Dili and later moved to Angola, where he graduated as a surveyor at
the Angolan School of Geography.  Upon his return to Dili he worked in the
Public Works Department as a Chartered Surveyor.10  Alkatiri’s Portuguese
education gave him entry to the small Portuguese-speaking urban elite.  He
became politically active as early as 1970, when he began to question Portu-
guese control of the territory.  He gravitated to the radical politics reaching
Dili from the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa and from radicals in
Portugal itself.  In the early 1970s, as a student in Angola, he made contact
with the radical Movimento Popular de Libertac¸a˜o de Angola (Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA).
Alkatiri was a founder member of the Associac¸a˜o Social Democrata
Timorense (Social Democratic Timorese Association, ASDT) and its succes-
sor Fretilin, founded in September 1974.  Fretilin was influenced by the ex-
8. Jill Jolliffe, East Timor, Nationalism & Colonialism (St Lucia, Queensland: University of
Queensland Press, 1978), p. 69.
9. Sarah Niner, ed., To Resist Is to Win! The Autobiography of Xanana Gusma˜o (Richmond,
Victoria, Australia: Aurora Books, 2000), pp. 3–5.
10. Alkatiri was born in Dili on November 26, 1949.  The family migrated from south Yemen
at the end of the nineteenth century: “Biographical Notes on Marõ´ Alkatiri” (Dili: Cabinet of the
Transitional Government, 2001).  Jolliffe, East Timor, p. 57.  His family has branches in the
Moluccan Islands and in West Timor and a cousin, Mar’ie Muhammad, was a finance minister in
the Suharto government; Jill Jolliffe, “Exile Returns to Run East Timor,” Asia Times, Hong
Kong, September 21, 2001.
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ample of successful liberation movements in Portuguese Africa, particularly
by the martyred Amõ´lcar Cabral’s Partido Africano da Independeˆncia da
Guine´ e Cabo Verde (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape
Verde) in Guinea-Bissau.  Samora Machel’s Frente de Libertac¸a˜o de Mo-
c¸ambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, Frelimo) provided the working
model for Fretilin.11  Some of the left faction in the Fretilin Central Commit-
tee also found inspiration in the Vietnamese revolution and in Mao Zedong’s
Cultural Revolution in China.  Alkatiri was linked to a nationalist-Marxist
group whose program was articulated by Vicente Sa’he and Mau Lear
(Anto´nio Carvarinho).  Armed with the credibility of his firsthand knowledge
of radical nationalism in Mozambique and Angola, Alkatiri was able to help
mediate nationalist-Marxist policies into the Fretilin platform.12
Allegations of communism in Fretilin were used as propaganda by the In-
donesians to justify their invasion in 1975.  James Dunn, a firsthand observer
in 1974–75 when Australian consul in Portuguese Timor, judges communist
influence in Fretilin at that time as negligible.  Observers sympathetic to the
independence struggle have been careful to point out that in 1975, even the
Marxist minority in Fretilin were nationalists first.  The front was an inclu-
sive coalition of conservative, moderate, and radical nationalists.13  Fretilin’s
president, Xavier do Amaral, and vice-president, Nicolau Lobato, were not
aligned with the left.  However, the Marxists, although a minority and posi-
tioned in the second echelon of the party leadership, were disproportionately
influential in the decision-making machinery.  The Marxist faction led by
Roque Rodrigues and Anto´nio Carvarinho persuaded the moderate leadership
to adopt revolutionary armed struggle and a radical land reform program.14
Alkatiri was a successful international advocate of Fretilin’s cause.  He
came to know Samora Machel, the leader of Frelimo.  He had already made
contact with the more doctrinaire MPLA in Angola.  He was invited by Presi-
11. Peter Carey, “Introduction,” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation,
eds.  Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (London: Cassell, 1995), p. 5.  On the political character
of Frelimo, see Patrick Chabal, “Angola and Mozambique: The Weight of History,” Contempo-
rary Portuguese Politics and History Research Centre, Dundee, Scotland, 2000, <http://www.
cphrc.org.uk/essays/chabal2.htm>. [Accessed March 14, 2003.]
12. John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War, the Hidden History of East Timor (London:
Zed Books, Ltd., 1991), p. 48.
13. Jolliffe, East Timor, p. 153; James Dunn, “Communist Influence in Fretilin Prior to the
1975 Invasion,” email to ETAN/US, July 29, 1998, <http://www.etan.org/et/1998/july/july29-31/
29communi.htm>.  [Accessed March 14, 2003.]
14. Bill Nicol, Timor: The Stillborn Nation (Camberwell, Victoria, Australia: Widescope,
1978), pp. 94, 104–05.  Rodrigues had been conscripted into the Portuguese army where he rose
to the rank of lieutenant and served in Mozambique.  In Lisbon he joined the ultra-left Maoist
group, the Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers/Movement for the Reorganization of the
Party of the Proletariat (Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadoes Portugueses/Movimento Reor-
ganizativo do Partido do Proletariado, PCTP/MRPP).
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dent Machel to attend Mozambique’s Independence Day celebrations in
1975.  As Fretilin’s national political commissioner, he toured Africa gather-
ing from 26 states pledges of “certain recognition” if Fretilin declared inde-
pendence from Portugal.  On his return to Dili, he was sworn in as minister of
state for political affairs in the Cabinet appointed on December 1.  He now
occupied the third position in Fretilin, behind Xavier do Amaral and Nicolau
Lobato.  His rise in the party made Alkatiri the most influential spokesman
for the left-wing factions in Fretilin.15  Jolliffe described Alkatiri at that time
as “a reasonable and competent politician with an intelligent grasp of foreign
affairs.”  Nonetheless a confidential report, made in October 1975 by a senior
Australian foreign affairs officer, advanced another view: “[t]here are several
extreme left ideologues in and around the Central Committee, the most im-
portant of whom is Alkatiri.”16
On December 3 that year, Alkatiri, Ramos Horta, and Roge´rio Tiago
Lobato left East Timor as the result of a Cabinet decision to seek interna-
tional support for the new republic.  Alkatiri and Lobato were to proceed to
Mozambique.  It was the beginning of a 24-year exile.  On December 7, Indo-
nesia invaded Dili.  Mozambique, which had achieved independence from
Portugal on June 25 that year, recognized the Timorese republic.  It accred-
ited Alkatiri as head of Fretilin’s mission and offered him safe haven.  To
support himself, he completed a law degree and worked for 10 years as a
lecturer in international law at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.
In 1977, he was appointed by the government in exile as minister for external
relations.  He married Marina Ribeiro, also a Timorese, and raised three chil-
dren.  Lobato had a more disorderly career in Africa: in 1983 he was con-
victed of diamond smuggling in Angola and jailed for several years.
Mauberism and Marxism
In these early years, nationalist, social democratic, and Marxist views within
Fretilin were all accommodated within Mauberism, an ideology created for
the party by Jose´ Ramos Horta.  The term mau bere, “my brother,” was a
local Mambai greeting that the Portuguese appropriated and used to denigrate
Timorese as backward and primitive people from the interior.17  Ramos
Horta claims authorship of the ideological transformation of this term into a
symbol of social justice:
15. Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 219–20; Nicol, Timor: The Stillborn Nation, pp. 102–05.
16. Ibid., p. 220.  Telegraphic message to Canberra, Darwin, October 22, 1975, in Australia
and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976, Documents in Australian
Foreign Policy, Document 284, ed.  Wendy Way (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, 2000), p. 500.
17. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War, p. 42.
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I began therefore to concoct our own version of social democracy by coining the
word Mauberism—from Maubere, a common name among the Mambai people
that had become a derogatory expression meaning poor, ignorant.  Though vaguely
defined without any serious theoretical basis, Maubere and Mauberism proved to
be the single most successful political symbol of our campaign.  Within weeks,
Maubere became the symbol of a cultural identity, of pride, of belonging.18
The celebration of Maubere identity allowed Fretilin to Timorize the idea
of “the people” (in a nationalist sense) and “the masses” (in a revolutionary
sense).  It provided the party with a radical foundation myth validating the
struggle for independence and social revolution.  Mauberism as an ideology
established a reading of popular sovereignty that was indigenous but not
traditional.  It authenticated the rural villager, not the traditional rulers (the
liurai) (who, in 1975, supported UDT rather than Fretilin).  Translated into a
radical social program, Mauberism validated
fundamental economic re-construction with production, distribution and consump-
tion cooperatives becoming the basic economic units . . . the expropriation of large
landholdings, the inclusion of unused fertile land in the cooperative system, the
implementation of agrarian reform and the diversification of monoculture, espe-
cially reliance on cash crops such as coffee.19
The Fretilin program stressed self-reliance and the rapid development of
Timorese participation in local decision making.  The party introduced educa-
tion and cultural programs, drawing on Paulo Freire’s rural literacy and adult
education work in Brazil.
Following the Indonesian occupation, the Central Committee moved fur-
ther to the left.  The radicalization of the party was completed in May 1977,
when Central Committee members still inside East Timor met, without their
leader, Xavier do Amaral, and acclaimed Marxism-Leninism as the party’s
guiding ideology.  Amaral was subsequently deposed.20  Vice-President
Nicolau Lobato, who assumed the presidency, was killed by Indonesian
troops in December 1978.
Gusma˜o, according to his own account, was a political innocent when he
joined Fretilin in May 1975.  By August he was working for Fretilin’s De-
partment of Information and was elected to the party’s Central Committee.
Following the Indonesian invasion, he moved to a Fretilin stronghold behind
18. Niner, ed., To Resist Is to Win! p. 3, note 1.
19. Carey, “Introduction,” East Timor at the Crossroads, p. 5.
20. Niner, To Resist Is to Win! p. 49, note 82.  Amaral was charged with treason.  His support-
ers were purged from the Central Committee.  Fretilin chose the same course as Frelimo in
Mozambique, which had declared itself a Marxist-Leninist Party in February 1977.
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Mount Matebian where he became the regional guerrilla leader of the Falintil,
the party’s armed wing.21
As a member of the Central Committee, Gusma˜o opposed the use of revo-
lutionary violence and did not condone the terrorism against “counter-revo-
lutionaries” that was conducted by other Falintil resistance groups in the
purges of 1977.  He applied himself, however, to the study of Marxism in an
effort to understand the ideological shift in the party and carried around with
him a copy of the Thoughts of Chairman Mao.22  Gusma˜o increasingly found
himself, as a Falintil commander, in opposition to the ideological extremists
in the party’s Central Committee.  His difficulties with the Fretilin leadership
increased as he assumed a leading role in the resistance.  In March 1981, he
was elected national political commissar, the post previously occupied by
Alkatiri, and commander-in-chief of Falintil.  At the same time, he was
elected president of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Con-
selho Revoluciona´rio da Resisteˆncia Nacional, CRRN).
By 1986, Gusma˜o was convinced that the resistance struggle must be
broadened.  He contacted the UDT leadership in Lisbon to propose that Falin-
til should pursue the independence struggle on behalf of all Timorese nation-
alist groups, not only Fretilin.  Fretilin’s external delegation and the exiled
representatives of UDT agreed to form a coalition.  On April 26, 1986, the
Conselho Nacional da Resisteˆncia Maubere (National Council of Maubere
Resistance, CNRM) was formed and Gusma˜o became its president.  CNRM
attempted to bring together all East Timorese groups including UDT, the stu-
dent group, Resisteˆncia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste (National
Resistance of the Students of East Timor), Renetil, as well as Fretilin.23
The creation of CNRM advanced Gusma˜o’s plan to remove the resistance
struggle from Fretilin control.  The final step was taken on December 7,
1987, the 12th anniversary of the Indonesian invasion, when Gusma˜o issued
an address to the people of East Timor in which he attacked the Central Com-
mittee of Fretilin for committing “enormous and excessive political errors.”
The Central Committee, he said, had been guilty of “political infantilism” and
doctrinaire Marxism.  Its senseless radicalism “paid no attention to our con-
crete conditions and limitations.  It made us intolerably overbearing and led
21. Damien Kingsbury, “East Timor to 1999,” in Guns and Ballot Boxes, East Timor’s Vote
for Independence, ed.  Damien Kingsbury (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University,
Asia Institute, 2000), p. 22.
22. Niner, To Resist Is to Win! p. 47.
23. Carey, East Timor at the Crossroads, pp. 7–8; Kingsbury, “East Timor to 1999,” pp.
22–23.  UDT rejected membership of the CNRM, suspicious of Fretilin domination.  See Dion-
isio Babo Soares, “Political Developments Leading to the Referendum,” in Out of the Ashes:
Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, eds. James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares
(Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000), p. 60.
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us to put many compatriots on the same footing as the criminal aggressor.
. . .” Falintil, he promised, would not permit the installation of a leftist regime
and would be neutral, independent of Fretilin control.  Its struggle was on
behalf of “the interests of all the citizens and social classes in East Timor”:
I publicly declare my total and wholehearted rejection of those doctrines that pro-
mote suppression of democratic freedoms in East Timor; I publicly declare that the
Falintil aswain [warrior] will not permit the installation of a leftist regime that not
only intends to provoke internal disintegration, but also to destabilise the whole
area in which East Timor is situated.24
In December 1988, Falintil’s neutrality was formalized through the Reajus-
tamento Estrutural da Resisteˆncia (the Reorganization of the Structure of the
Resistance).  Ten years later, in April 1998, all the nationalist parties, includ-
ing UDT, met in Portugal and agreed to join the Conselho Nacional da Resis-
teˆncia Timorense (the National Council for Timorese Resistance, CNRT).
Gusma˜o, then in an Indonesian jail, was elected president.  Fretilin comprised
the largest component in the CNRT but did not regain control of Falintil.
Gusma˜o had achieved his object: from 1987 until independence in 2002,
Falintil was permanently separated from Fretilin control.
The rift opened between Gusma˜o and Fretilin by his decision in December
1987 to leave the party has never been repaired.  By 1991, Gusma˜o observed
that his relationship with the Fretilin Central Committee was less tense “but
there are political suspicions, which are not created or wished by me.”25  Al-
though Marxism is no longer the issue, the 1987 split continues to divide the
president and the Alkatiri government today.
The Transition to Independence
When Gusma˜o and Alkatiri returned to East Timor, Gusma˜o from house ar-
rest in Indonesia and Alkatiri from exile in Mozambique, they had been es-
tranged for at least 12 years.  Back in Dili, Gusma˜o said that he was “more
Falintil than CNRT”26 and he pointedly appeared before the crowds and the
world media in a Falintil uniform.  The animosity between Gusma˜o and the
Fretilin secretary-general was public knowledge.  Ramos Horta, who at-
tempted to mediate between them, remarked that Gusma˜o had “a strong re-
sentment and anger towards Fretilin.  He saw Fretilin’s campaign in the
August 30, 2001, elections as reminiscent of its radicalism of the 1970s.”  In
24. Niner, To Resist Is to Win! p. 135.
25. Ibid., p. 149.
26. George J. Aditjondro, “Self-Determination under Globalisation: Timor Loro Sa’e’s Trans-
formation from Jakarta’s Colony to a Global Capitalist Outpost,” revision of a paper presented to
the conference Protesting Globalisation: Prospects for Trans-National Solidarity, Sydney: Uni-
versity of Technology Sydney, December 10–11, 1999), p. 10.
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the August campaign for the Constituent Assembly elections, Gusma˜o ig-
nored Fretilin rallies, attending a rival Democratic Party rally instead.  He
was publicly critical of the Fretilin leaders’ aggressive conduct of the cam-
paign.  He publicly rebuked Alkatiri for threatening that on the day after win-
ning the election, Fretilin would “go out, broom in hand, or with other things,
to clean our city, to clean our village, to clean our district and sub-district; to
show that Fretilin has won . . . and wants to start a new life.”27
Sixteen parties contested the August elections.  Alkatiri went into the cam-
paign confident his party would win by a landslide, predicting it would attract
over 80% of the vote.  In the event, Fretilin won 55 of the 88 seats with just
57% of the vote, short of the two-thirds majority required to ratify the Consti-
tution without the support of other parties.  While Fretilin did pick up 12 of
the 13 seats in the district contests, in the nationally contested seats its share
of the vote in some districts was quite poor.  Its poorest showing was in
Aileu, a Falintil stronghold where Gusma˜o established himself on his return
in 1999.
In the national parliament, Fretilin is opposed by the Partido Democra´tico
(Democratic Party, PD), with seven seats.  PD was founded by leaders of the
student movement and ran against Fretilin because its supporters believed
their opposition to Indonesian rule had been undervalued by the returning
leaders of the generation of 1975.  Fretilin’s major opponent in the parliament
from the right is the Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party, PSD),
led by Ma´rio Viegas Carrascala˜o.  Ma´rio and his brother Joa˜o Carrascala˜o
were founders of UDT, the party that Fretilin fought in the civil war in 1975.
Joa˜o Carrascala˜o was also in the parliament for a time as one of the two
representatives of the UDT.  Ma´rio Carrascala˜o and his brothers represent not
just an opposition group in parliament but a wealthy family whose business
interests as much as their long-standing political ambitions make them rivals
for control of the new state.28  Alkatiri’s stated commitment to multiparty,
pluralist politics will be tested if the Carrascala˜o clan is able to mobilize
significant support in advance of future elections.  Fretilin is supported by the
Associac¸a˜o Social Democrata Timorense (Social Democratic Timorese Asso-
ciation, ASDT), with six seats.  ASDT gives Fretilin the two-third majority it
needs under the Constitution to approve revisions to it (Section 95: 3 [j]), or
to approve criminal proceedings against the president (Section 79: 3).  The
way the Constitution sets out the relative power of president and the govern-
ment is discussed further below.
When he won control of the Assembly, Alkatiri said that his goal was to
create a new basis of national unity: “In the past, national cohesion was built
27. Newsweek, September 17, 2001; SBS Television Dateline program, October 3, 2001.
28. Hill and Saldanha, East Timor, p. 31.
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upon opposition to the occupant.  Today it must be built around the goal of
reconciliation and social justice.”  He promised a formula of inclusion that
was not one of “alliances between political leaders” but the selection of mem-
bers of the government team according to individual merit and abilities.29
Ma´rio Carrascala˜o doubted this:
Xanana will make some concessions, but Marõ´ Alkatiri will not be flexible enough,
because he is looking like an authoritarian.  Xanana knows the real problems of the
people.  Alkatiri came back after 24 years away: he knows Mozambique.30
The test of Alkatiri’s promise of inclusive democracy was the selection of the
Council of Ministers (the Cabinet).  Today, 10 of the 14 ministers and secre-
taries of state are Fretilin, the other four are independents associated with
Fretilin.
The antagonism between Gusma˜o and Alkatiri, evident in the election
campaign to the Constituent Assembly, resurfaced in the April 14, 2002,
presidential elections.  Fretilin encouraged Gusma˜o to run as a nonpartisan
independent.  Instead, he chose to accept the nomination of nine smaller par-
ties, effectively accepting the endorsement of the parliamentary opposition.
He promised that if elected president, he would continue to pay attention to
the democratic process, to help people assimilate the values of democracy.31
Translated, this was a promise to provide a counterbalance to Fretilin.  Gus-
ma˜o sees himself, as James Dunn has observed, as “more of a leader of the
Timorese political community in general” than party-political, a national
leader prepared to provide a counterbalance to Fretilin’s current domination
of the parliament.32
Alkatiri and the Fretilin leadership refused to endorse Gusma˜o’s campaign
for president, instead giving discreet support to his sole opponent, Xavier do
Amaral.  Alkatiri claimed that because of his opposition to Fretilin, Gusma˜o
could no longer claim to be a national leader, and made it clear he would not
vote for Gusma˜o and would instead cast a blank ballot.  In the event, Gusma˜o
was elected president by an overwhelming 82.7% of the vote.  In his declara-
tion speech after the election, he promised to act as the elected president “for
the whole nation, not only those who voted for me.”33
29. Speech at the swearing in of the transitional government, Dili, September 20, 2001,
<http://www.etan.org/et2001c/september/16-22/20speech.htm>.
30. Quoted by Dan Murphy, “East Timor President Faces First Challenge: Parliament,” Chris-
tian Science Monitor, April 19, 2002.
31. Carol Pineau, “East Timor’s Gusmao Says He’ll Do His Best,” Reuters, March 20, 2002.
32. James Dunn, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) radio interview (April 12,
2002).
33. He congratulated the people in Aileu for exercising their democratic right by voting not
for him but for the rival presidential candidate, Xavier do Amaral: “Declaration of Kay Rala
Xanana Gusma˜o on the announcement of the results of East Timor’s first presidential elections,”
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The Constitution, designed by the Fretilin-dominated Constituent Assem-
bly, was loosely based on the current Portuguese constitutional system.34
Promulgated on March 22, 2002, the Constitution located executive power in
the prime minister and Cabinet, and not in the presidency, reflecting Fretilin’s
calculation that Gusma˜o would win a presidential election.35  During the
election, Gusma˜o jokingly told the international media, “The constitution
does not allow me to put my five cents in.  As president I will not have many
responsibilities but I can express the desperation of the people.”  Responding
to such comments, Arlindo Marc¸al, the vice-president of the Constituent As-
sembly, explained, “The constitution provides for a semi-presidential system
in which there is a balance between the powers of the organs of sovereignty.
We have a different system than the USA or Indonesia.  But the East
Timorese president will also be powerful, and won’t have just a ceremonial
function.”36
As Dunn has noted, whatever the constitutional limitations, Gusma˜o’s per-
sonal authority makes the presidency a force in national politics.37  Indeed,
the Constitution provides the president with more than symbolic powers.  The
president is head of state and “the symbol and guarantor of national indepen-
dence and unity of the State and of the smooth functioning of the democratic
institutions.”  He is supreme commander of the Defense Force.  His five-year
term of office coincides with that of the parliament.  The president has some
apparent powers: to veto any statute (for up to 90 days after its passage in the
parliament), to request the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of
government rules, and to submit relevant issues to a referendum.  The presi-
dent can also convene extraordinary sessions of the national parliament and
dissolve the parliament in case of a serious institutional crisis preventing the
formation of a government or the approval of the State Budget (Section 86:
[d] [f]).  For its part, a two-thirds majority of the parliament can initiate crim-
inal proceedings before the Supreme Court against a president.
Dili, April 17, 2002, <http://www.etra.zip.com.au/xgdecpresen.html>.  [Accessed March 14,
2003.]
34. Quoted by the BBC, February 9, 2002, <http://www.etan.org/et2002a/february/01-09/
09etcoos.htm>.  The 1975 Portuguese Constitution was a semi-presidential model with the presi-
dent “neither a figurehead nor all-powerful.”  See Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System
Model: Semi-presidential Government,” in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed.
Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 148.  In Portugal, revisions to the
Constitution since 1975 have shifted power toward the parliament.
35. See Paulo Gorja˜o, “The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Adminis-
tration in East Timor,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24:2 (August 2002), p. 322.
36. Press release, Constituent Assembly East Timor, February 15, 2002, <http://www.tip.net.
au/~wildwood/02febca.htm>.  [Accessed March 14, 2003.]
37. ABC radio interview (April 12, 2002).
This content downloaded from 138.80.0.10 on Wed, 21 Aug 2013 21:00:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DENNIS SHOESMITH 245
Within weeks of independence, the president formally castigated the gov-
ernment.  In an address to the nation, Gusma˜o condemned members of parlia-
ment as “enormously irresponsible” for failing to attend sessions regularly
and lacking dedication.  He said, “We should give it, in the first place, six
months—enough time for all of us to know whether our government is or is
not doing something to benefit our country.”38  He noted that in two recent
sessions, members of parliament (MPs) had not attained a quorum to approve
legislation.  He warned MPs that if they did not mend their ways, “[T]hey
will create the legitimate impression that parliament needs better-qualified
people, more capable of responding to political demands.”  He also attacked
the Fretilin-drafted Constitution for providing inadequate protection for a free
media.  The speech, putting the government on notice so early in its term,
demonstrated that Gusma˜o did not intend to be simply a ceremonial head of
state.  Alkatiri refused to respond in kind to the criticisms, putting the attack
down to Gusma˜o’s style: “He likes to administer shock therapy, to wake peo-
ple up, but we don’t need a wake-up call.  I don’t see it as a declaration of
war.  He did say people should give us more time, after all.  Let him talk.”39
Gusma˜o can appeal to a strong popular expectation that government must
be democratic and clean, as well as effective.40  Fretilin, for its part, will find
it difficult to live with the commitment to inclusive and democratic mul-
tiparty politics.  In the first place, as the government of a new state, Fretilin’s
leadership is determined to establish its right to authoritatively make and en-
force the rules.  This involves a struggle for state policy to prevail over oppo-
sition and autonomous social organizations.  In the second place, Fretilin
denies the legitimacy of its parliamentary opponents on the right, whom Fre-
tilin regards as collaborators and landlords.  Outside the parliament, the party
is challenged by an extremist breakaway group, the Conselho Popular pela
Defesa da Repu´blica Democra´tica de Timor Leste (Popular Council for the
Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, CPD-RDTL) and disaf-
fected Falintil veterans.  CPD-RDTL was established in 1999 and identifies
itself with the original independent republic proclaimed on November 28,
1975.  It claims to be the “real” Fretilin.  It staged a rival independence rally
on November 28, 2002, that attracted 3,000 supporters, humiliating the prime
minister at the official ceremony where only some 300 people attended.  Pro-
voked by such opposition, the temptation will be for Fretilin to repeat the
38. Jill Jolliffe, “Gusmao Puts MPs on Notice to Improve,”Sydney Morning Herald, June 14,
2002.
39. Quoted in ibid.
40. See, for instance, the findings of “Timor Loro Sa’e Is Our Nation”: A Report on Focus
Group Discussions in East Timor (Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, March 2001), p. 2, <http://www.ndi.org>.  [Accessed March 16,2003.]
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history of other post-revolution liberation movements and attempt to install a
de facto one-party system.
The Army and the Police
The government must look to its security agencies to support its authority.
There are early signs that this support may not be forthcoming.  By late 2001,
the United Nations Transitional Administration was aware that the division
between followers of Gusma˜o and the Alkatiri government was widening and
a potentially dangerous power struggle was under way.  The new national
army was caught up in this struggle.
Falintil presents a major problem for the Alkatiri government.  The pream-
ble in the Constitution celebrates the “historical struggle carried out by the
glorious forces for national liberation” and, understandably, many Falintil
veterans now feel they have earned a privileged place in independent East
Timor.  Their reintegration into civilian life, however, is difficult.  Falintil
veterans were provided some financial support by the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM) through its Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program
(FRAP), funded by the World Bank and the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), but this support ended in December 2001.41
In September 2000, the East Timor Transitional Cabinet made a critical
decision to adopt the recommendations presented as “Option Three” by an
independent study team from the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College,
London.  The option was to establish over three years the East Timor Defense
Force (ETDF, or its Portuguese acronym, FDTL) as a light-infantry force of
1,500 regulars and 1,500 reservists.  The first battalion, formed in 2001,
before independence, was composed entirely of 650 Falintil veterans.  The
U.N. Transitional Administration agreed that the Falintil High Command
would control the selection process for the first battalion.  The High Com-
mand ensured that the officer corps of the FDTL was selected from those
Falintil commanders loyal to Gusma˜o and to Falintil commander, and now
commander of the FDTL, Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak.  The senior
commanders and most of the Falintil recruits in the first battalion were drawn
from the area collectively referred to as “Firaku” in the eastern districts (with
around 30% of the population).  The Firaku of the eastern districts were most
strongly identified with the independence movement, maintaining the armed
struggle against Indonesian forces.  James Fox has remarked that “Battalion I
of the ETDF is preponderantly a Firaku force and this has quietly been noted
as such by East Timorese in western districts [collectively known as
41. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), “Transition of
Falintil into East Timor Defence Force,” Fact Sheet, Dili, February 1, 2001.
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‘Kaladi’].”42  The Kaladi make up some 50% of the population.  The Firaku-
Kaladi ethnic divide is a potential fault-line in East Timorese politics.43  The
core of the new defense force is identified, then, not only with the president
and commander-in-chief, rather than the government, but with one ethnic col-
lectivity rather than another.  This has provoked protests and allegations of
political favoritism in the new force.
From its inception, it was clear that the FDTL was not to be a neutral
professional force under civilian control.  At a speech marking the simultane-
ous demobilization of Falintil and the establishment of the FDTL, Brigadier-
General Ruak reminded the government that the recruitment for the first
FDTL contingent exclusively from within Falintil ranks guaranteed “the con-
tinuity of the spirit of Falintil, the legacy of its history, its symbolism and its
bond with the People of East Timor. . . . I affirm once again: there will be no
destabilising campaign that will annul the institution that is Falintil and its
identity. . . .44
The political character of the army has grave implications for the Alkatiri
government.  The first battalion was established before the independent gov-
ernment was in place and able to influence the character of the new force.
Now formally designated the Falintil-FDTL (F-FDTL), the army is effec-
tively controlled by Gusma˜o loyalists, officers selected as senior commanders
in what one Western security analyst called “a political demobilization”
through which “Xanana’s friends got in and his enemies were left out.  It’s a
politicized military.  They are very much Xanana’s boys.”45  Once he had
assumed command, Ruak was able to limit recruitment to the second battal-
ion to 18- to 21-year-olds with a high school education.  This effectively
excluded from the national army those Falintil veterans who had not been
recruited into the first battalion and whose loyalty to Ruak and Gusma˜o was
questionable.  The young recruits in the second battalion are reportedly loyal
to their commander-in-chief and to their supreme commander.  Whether they
are loyal to the government is untested.
42. James J. Fox, “Recent Security Developments in East Timor,” Australian Member Com-
mittee of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (AUS-CSCAP), Newsletter, no. 12
(November 2001), p. 7.
43. Anthony L. Smith, “East Timor” (2001).  Self-Determination Conflict Profile, a project
associated with Foreign Policy in Focus (U.S.A.).  The author was a Fellow of the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, <http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/timor_body.html>.
[Accessed March 16, 2003.]
44. Speech on the occasion of the transitional ceremony from Falintil to the Defence Force of
East Timor, Aileu, February 1, 2001, <http://www.etan.org/et2001a/february/01-03/01taur.htm>.
[Accessed March 16, 2003.]
45. Mark Dodd, “East Timor’s New Govt Faces a Challenge from Rebels,” Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, July 4, 2002.
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The Falintil core of the defense forces represents the culmination of the
policy Gusma˜o launched in 1987: the separation of the armed forces from
Fretilin control.  It is the context that has changed: the Falintil core has been
transformed into the national army of an independent state.  The survival of
the government of that state may depend upon the ability to assert its author-
ity over armed forces loyal to its political rival, the president.  Within the F-
FDTL, there are reported difficulties with discipline and training.  Falintil
veterans have no tradition of professionalism under civilian control.  Some
soldiers are said to appear only to collect their pay packets.  The ASPI re-
port’s assessment is that the F-FDTL “has limited capabilities and no clear
role in meeting East Timor’s current security problems.”46
Demobilized Falintil fighters who were not recruited into the F-FDTL are a
destabilizing element.  Organized into separate veterans’ associations, they
constitute a challenge to state control.  Gusma˜o is the leader of the largest
Falintil veterans’ organization, the Association of Veterans of the Resistance
(AVR), founded in July 2001.  The AVR encompasses ex-Falintil and also
civilian militants who worked underground in the CNRT during the Indone-
sian administration (the Clandestino organizations).  The AVR claims over
18,000 members.  A second veteran’s group, the Falintil Veterans Founda-
tion, with General Ruak and his deputy, Colonel Lere Anan Timor, on its
board, is also identified with the Gusma˜o faction.  Opposed to the Gusma˜o
loyalists is the Falintil force led by Corne´lio Gama (whose resistance code
name was L-7 or “Elle Sette,” also known as Elli Foho Boot) of Laga, Bau-
cau.  The Fretilin minister of internal administration, Roge´rio Lobato, is asso-
ciated with this group.  Gama broke with Gusma˜o’s Falintil in 1985 and
commanded an independent armed movement in the hinterland of Baucau.  In
February 2000, he took his men out of the Falintil cantonment in Aileu and
re-established his power base in Baucau.  Gama was angered by his exclusion
from the new national army and its dominance by “Xanana’s boys.”  General
Ruak deployed the F-FDTL first battalion to the Baucau area after the procla-
mation of independence, presumably to check Gama’s influence there.47
Hugh White, director of ASPI and a former deputy of the Australian De-
fence Department, has identified internal security as East Timor’s most ur-
gent priority.  White warns that East Timor may “extend up with organized
groups of Fretilin veteran fighters outside the East Timor Defence [Force] in
opposition to those who are inside the East Timor Defence Force. . . . The
46. ASPI, New Neighbours, New Challenge; and evidence from an informant in the interna-
tional peacekeeping force, June 30, 2002.
47. Dodd, “A Challenge from Rebels.”  In one incident, a U.N. Peacekeeping Force (PKF)
Military Police unit managed to persuade three truckloads of armed FDTL soldiers to turn back
and not attack rival elements in Baucau.
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East Timor Defence Force could go the way of the PNG Defence and end up
being a strategic liability, rather than a strategic asset. . . .”48
The Timor-Leste Police Service (TLPS) is the second critical security
agency in the new state.  There are presently some 1,300 East Timorese po-
lice officers deployed in the 13 districts.  ASPI describes the police force as
“poorly trained, [with] almost no equipment, and . . . severely under-funded.”
The report concludes that East Timor’s security institutions are not equal to
the task of ensuring that the state will be viable.  The international aid effort
should focus on East Timor’s urgent security problems as a priority.49
There are indications that the TLPS and Falintil-FDTL are emerging as
rival agencies.  There have been a number of violent clashes between police
and Falintil-FDTL personnel.  On November 8, 2002, Defense force recruits
attacked traffic police in the Dili market, seriously injuring two of them.  Po-
lice Commissioner Paulo Martins and F-FDTL Commander Ruak both
rushed to the market to help restore calm.  Five recruits and an army captain
were later arrested.50  While such incidents may be provoked by local rival-
ries, there have been allegations that Minister Lobato has attempted to politi-
cize the TLPS.51  As a counterweight to Falintil-FDTL, Lobato has cultivated
the support of rival Falintil factions.  He moved to appoint Corne´lio Gama as
his department’s security adviser in July 2002, aligning Gama’s veterans’
organization with the Fretilin government and, by implication, as a counter-
balance to President Gusma˜o’s Falintil loyalists.52  Lobato, at the same time,
was maneuvering to win over Gama’s veterans to strengthen his own faction
within Fretilin against Alkatiri and Alkatiri’s close allies, the party president,
Francisco Guterres, and Justice Minister (now newly appointed Minister of
State) Ana Pesoa.53
The police commissioner, Paulo Fa´tima Martins, was a serving police of-
ficer under the Indonesians.  His civilian superior is the minister for internal
48. Interviewed on ABC radio, Lateline program, May 20, 2002.
49. ASPI, New Neighbours, New Challenge.
50. “Police-Military Rivalry in Timor,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 5, 2002, p.
12.
51. At a press conference after the Baucau riot, Commissioner Peter Miller was asked about
allegations that Lobato had “weakened police authority.”  Miller replied that Lobato may have
received “wrong information” and that “this is a new country and a new ministry. . . . There will
be mistakes,” “Police and Rights Officials Address Baucau Violence,” Judicial System Monitor-
ing Program News, December 2, 2002, <http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/03_12_02.htm>.
[Accessed March 16, 2003.]
52. Gama was given use of a government car but he didn’t take up the offer.  By March 2003,
he was warning of “a possible new civil war.”  See Chris McCall, “Timor Fighter Turns His
Venom on Its Leaders,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2003.
53. Chris McCall, “Bright Hopes, Bitter Reality: East Timor after Independence,” ibid.,
March 13, 2003.
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administration.  Martins works alongside the United Nations Police (UN-
POL) commissioner, Peter Miller, representing the United Nations Mission of
Support in East Timor (UNMISET).  Martins has a reputation for profession-
alism.  He is said to have stood up to Lobato to counter attempts to politicize
police recruitment.  In September, Lobato drew up a list of some 500 resis-
tance veterans (presumably from his and Gama’s veterans association) for
recruitment to the National Police.  He publicly called for former guerrillas to
be appointed rather than police officers who had served under the former
Indonesian administration.54  Martins defended the recruitment policy based
on qualifications and education.
Attacks against the police became a major national security issue in late
November 2002.  On November 25, a mob including angry unemployed vet-
erans attacked the Baucau police headquarters.  They were protesting their
exclusion from recruitment into the police service.  The building was ran-
sacked and several vehicles were damaged.  One protester was killed and
several others were wounded.  Lobato’s dealings with disaffected veterans
provoked Gusma˜o to demand his removal from office.  In his independence
anniversary speech on November 28, Gusma˜o went much further in his pub-
lic attack against Fretilin than he had in June.  After again berating parlia-
mentarians, “many of whom are constantly absent,” he ridiculed Fretilin and
its manipulation of “independence” to care for its cadres.  He underlined the
growing security problem:
November 28th 2002, is celebrated, with a feeling of grief because of the problems
in Uatu-Lari, the problems in Dili, the problems in Ualili and Baucau, the problems
in Same and Ainaro, the problems in Ermera and Liquic¸a and the problems in Suai
and Maliana.  Unfortunately, it seems that by creating problems, one can rise to
become a Minister, and these same people, after becoming Ministers, only know
how to increase existing problems. . . . I seize this opportunity to demand of the
Government to dismiss the Minister for Internal Administration, Mr. Roge´rio
Lobato, on the grounds of incompetence and neglect.
The Parliament Speaker, Francisco Guterres, denounced this demand as dic-
tatorial, and Alkatiri announced that his rejection of the demand was “abso-
lute.”55
54. Jill Jolliffe, “Gusmao Lashes Out at Politicians,” Age (Melbourne), November 29, 2002;
Suara Timor Lorosa’e (Voice of East Timor), September 23, 2002; LUSA (Lusa Ageˆncia de
Notõ´cias de Portugal/Lusa Portuguese News Agency), Notõ´cia (news item), no. 4378838, No-
vember 25, 2002.
55. “Speech by H. E. President of the Republic Kay Rala Xanana Gusma˜o at the Official
Ceremonies Commemorating 28th November,” Dili, November 28, 2002, http://etan.org/
et2002c/november/24-30/28xgspech.htm; Jolliffe, “Gusmao Lashes Out”; “Dili Riots May Have
Been ‘Planned Attack’ Says UN Mission Chief,” LUSA, Notõ´cia, no. 4419940, December 6,
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The December 4 Riots in Dili
The Baucau riot was a prelude to a large counterdemonstration by CPD-
RDTL supporters on Independence Day, November 28, in Dili.  The climax
of two weeks of violence came on December 4, when some 500 students
attacked the Dili National Police Headquarters, angered by the arrest of a
student on gang-related charges.  President Gusma˜o, when he attempted to
calm the demonstrators, was pelted with stones and had to retreat under guard
into the police headquarters.  Shots were fired and the protest moved on to
the parliament building where there was more gunfire and the building was
damaged.  In the course of the day, two protesters were killed, others seri-
ously injured after police fired into the crowd.  Dili’s An Mur Mosque was
attacked.  Prime Minister Alkatiri’s house and other houses belonging to his
brothers were destroyed.  A foreign-owned supermarket and hotel were
burned and other shops were looted.  Instigators were observed directing the
crowd to attack certain targets and supplying them with gasoline for arson.
The parliament building was attacked and damaged.  According to a joint
statement by the Civil Society Organizations in Timor Lorosa’e group, the
violence was systematic and manifestly political, notably directed against Al-
katiri and his family.  The statement claims that agents aroused the crowd,
attacking the prime minister and directing the violence against political
targets.  The rioters were provided with gasoline for arson and with transport.
Some rioters were heard shouting “Oust Alkatiri!” “Paulo [Martins] resign!”
“Roge´rio [Lobato] stay!”56  An Australian journalist who covered the riots
claimed that “there is substantial evidence that powerful Fretilin officials
from within the Interior Ministry were involved in trucking in protesters from
rural areas and then inciting the rioters once the violence began.57
The rioting marked the end of the brief period when the new state could
draw on the euphoria of independence to sustain its legitimacy.  The Alkatiri
government is now blamed for poverty and unemployment (and for providing
prize positions for its friends).  Alkatiri has a respectable personal reputation
but his government is beginning to attract accusations of “Corruption, Collu-
sion, and Nepotism” (familiarly known as CCN, an ironic reference to the
Indonesian acronym KKN for Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme, the accusation
made against the Suharto regime).  Some observers detect a mood of resent-
ment against the country’s new political e´lite, particularly the returned exiles
2002; “PM Alkatiri Rejects President’s Demand He Sack Interior Minister,” LUSA, Notõ´cia, no.
4402579, December 2, 2002.
56. “Never Sacrifice People for Political Ambition,” Joint Statement of Civil Society Organi-
zations in Timor Lorosa’e, Dili, December 7, 2002, <http://www.etan.org/et2002c/december/01-
07/07civsoc.htm>.  [Accessed March 16, 2003.]
57. Mark Baker, “East Timor at Flashpoint as Disillusionment Sets In,” Sydney Morning Her-
ald, December 14, 2002.
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and their determination to impose a Portuguese-style culture on the govern-
ment and administration of the new state.58
Conclusion
In assessing the potential for trouble for the new state of Timor-Leste, the
temptation is to highlight the risks and dangers rather than the less-dramatic
positive factors.  This sort of analysis runs the danger of accumulating nega-
tive evidence until a worst-case scenario appears inevitable.  Mindful of this
caution, it does appear, nevertheless, that the political divisions examined in
this paper are real and will need to be addressed if the leadership of the new
state is to establish order, effective government, and multiparty democracy.
The fault line established by a semi-presidential system complicates the al-
ready formidable task of establishing an effective and at the same time demo-
cratic system of governance.  A presidential system probably would have
been a more coherent system for a new state lacking an established set of
governing institutions.  That the Fretilin leadership rejected a presidential
model reflected not only their familiarity with the Portuguese mixed model
but almost certainly their recognition of the risk that Gusma˜o would capture
the presidency and leave Fretilin excluded from power.
Deep antagonisms at the highest level of the national leadership seem to be
encouraging a polarization of political alliances that could threaten the new
state’s viability.  The disturbing events of November-December 2002 appear
to confirm a pessimistic prognosis for the new state.  If Timor-Leste is to
overcome these challenges, the relationship between Prime Minister Alkatiri
and President Gusma˜o over the coming months will be critical.  Will they put
aside their long-standing differences in the interests of national stability, or
will the president use the gathering unrest to increase his pressure on the
Fretilin government in the hope of replacing it?  The prime minister, for his
part, will need to discipline his cabinet and, in particular, his minister for
internal administration as a necessary condition for his government to regain
control of the security situation.  In terms of both democratic development
and disciplined governance, the central issue between the two leaders remains
the position that Fretilin should occupy in the new state: as an equal member
of a competitive multiparty democracy or as the party with an exclusive his-
toric right to govern.  The resolution of this issue is at the center of Timorese
politics now, as it was in 1975.
58. Tim Dodd, “Wealth Divide behind Timor Violence,” Australian Financial Review, De-
cember 6, 2002.
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